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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards,' a significantly amended and
modified revision of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT 1947),2 was enacted under the World Trade Organization (WTO) system in
1994.' The Agreement is designed to prevent safeguard measures from being
selectively applied to individual countries and to force each country to abolish "gray
area" measures, such as voluntary export restraints (VERs), orderly marketing
agreements (OMAs), basic price systems, export moderation, and export-import price
monitoring systems.4 Under the Agreement, the total period of operation of safeguard
1. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 175 (2nd ed. 2000) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] (defining "safeguards" as being
"generally used to denote government actions responding to imports that are deemed to 'harm' the importing country's
economy or domestic competing industries . . .the term 'safeguards' embraces a number of legal and political
concepts, including that of the escape clause.. ." (emphasis added).
To obtain information on the history and use of safeguards (i.e., the "escape clause"), see id. at 175-81 (noting
that "[t]he modem era of safeguards measures stems from the beginning of the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements
program of its 1934 act"); see also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, 604-10 (3rd ed. 1995) [hereinafter JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS] (same); THOMAS V. VAKERICS ET
AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUTY, AND OTHER TRADE ACTIONS, 273-75 (1987) (same).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-i1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947]. Prior to the Uruguay Round, safeguard measures were governed mainly by Article XIX of
GAIT, which is often referred to as GATT's "escape clause." JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at
596-97. Article XIX is the central and most prominent safeguards provision of GATT; however, a number of other
measures are taken under GATT, or in evading GATT, that can also be termed "safeguard." Various GATT clauses
afford nations an opportunity to impose border-import restraints, some of which may be "safeguard." For example,
both Article XII and Article XVIII of GATT provide some exceptions for balance-of-payments situations. These
measures can often provide GATT with legal cover for various border-import restraints that are motivated by
safeguard policies. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 180.
3. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IA, available at http://www/wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf
[hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
4. See JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 597 (explaining that Article XX of GAIT:
[Sipecifies standards that are supposed to be met before safeguards measures can be imposed. But
these standards were increasingly disregarded as other techniques to protect domestic industries,
such as 'voluntary' export restraints and orderly marketing agreements, came to replace formal
actions under Article XIX. In the United States, for example, the domestic statute that implements
U.S. rights and obligations under Article XIX (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974) has been
used very little in recent years, with only a handful of actions filed since the mid-1980s, mostly in
small industries and mostly unsuccessful. Yet, during the same period, the U.S. automobile
industry was protected by a voluntary restraint agreement with Japan, the U.S. steel industry was
protected by a network of voluntary restraint agreements with major steel producing nations, and
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measures must not surpass eight years, counting the period of application of any
provisional measure as well as the period of initial application, including extensions!
In addition, a second application of safeguard measures against the same item is not
allowed for at least two years from the date of the initial application. The existing
safeguard measures, taken pursuant to Article XIX of GATT 1947, should be
rescinded within eight years of the initial application of the WTO Agreement or five
years of the date of entry into the WTO, whichever comes later. To preserve the
effectiveness of safeguards, the Agreement specifies that the export country may not
retaliate against the import country for three years after initial application of safeguard
8measures.
Considering the Agreement on Safeguards, the prohibition of selective application
and the four-year grace period for abolishing "gray area" measures seem to have had
favourable effects on international trade for the Republic of Korea (hereinafter Korea).
In fact, Korea will expectantly bear less of a burden in bilateral negotiations with
major partner countries such as the United States,9 the EU countries, and Japan due to
its weak bargaining power against them. However, the frequency of operation of
safeguard measures is predicted to increase compared to the GATT 1947 system'0 for
two reasons: first, because the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards requires that
essentially all "gray area" measures be eliminated," and second, because the importing
country can apply safeguard measures without any concern for import quantity
restrictions for three years, while the exporting country is not allowed to retaliate
against the safeguard measures.'2 Even though negotiations over compensation are
the U.S. textile and apparel industries continued to enjoy protection under the Multifiber
Arrangement ... Trade restrictions such as these, taken outside the formal ambit of Article XIX,
have come to be known as "gray area" measures. Although they are negotiated without formal
reference to the legal requirements in Article XIX, they nevertheless embody government-to-
government accords, and nations have had little incentive to complain about them).
With regard to the "gray area" measures, the preamble of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards reads
"... to re-establish multilateral control over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape such control ... " Uruguay
Round Agreement on Safeguards Preamble.
5. Id. art. 7(3).
6. Id. art. 7(5).
7. Id. art. 10.
8. Id. art. 8(2)(3).
9. Since 1988, when Korea recorded total foreign trade of US$100 billion with the first trade surplus in Korean
history, the system to regulate and administer foreign trade in Korea has been influenced by trade friction with, and
pressure from, partner countries such as the United States as well as by the requirements of international trade
organizations. Since the 1980s, trade friction with the United States, the largest export market for Korea, has been one
of the most serious problems for the Korean government in its attempt to expand foreign trade. Eun Sup Lee,
Regulation of International Trade in Korea Under the WTO Mechanism, in 3 NEw ZEALAND ASS'N FOR COMP. L.
513, 516-17 (1998) [hereinafter Regulation of International Trade in Korea].
10. See JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 653 (stating that "[iln the period leading up to the
Uruguay Round, there was a feeling that the compensation requirement of Article XIX discouraged its use and
encouraged resort to 'gray area' measures").
11. Id. at 597.
12. See id. at 653-54; see also .upra note 8.
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required in all cases under the provisions of the Uruguay Round on Safeguards, 3 the
importing nation seemingly faces no credible threat of a retaliatory suspension of
concessions during the first three years of WTO membership due to GATIT's legal
safeguards, which respond to an absolute rise in imports.
4
Relying on the safeguard measures of the GA'IT 1947 system has been more
difficult for Korea with its small open economy 5 than it has been for other partner
countries, such as the United States. That is, Korea's dependency on foreign trade is
much larger than that of other partner countries, and its major exporting items have
been less competitive in the partner countries' markets, which have been vulnerable to
all sorts of retaliatory barriers.
7
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper will examine how the
safeguard agreement under the WTO system has been absorbed into and applied to
Korea's safeguard system. Second, it will investigate how Korea can avoid the
devastation of its industry from the rapid increase of importation while staying within
the boundaries of the WTO Agreement.
II. OUTLINE OF KOREA'S SAFEGUARD SYSTEM
Korea's safeguard system for seeking relief measures against industrial injuries
due to rapid increases in imports has its legal basis in two Acts: the industrial injury
relief system of the Act on the Investigation of Unfair International Trade Practice and
13. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, arts. 8(1)-8(3).
14. JACKSONErAL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 653-54.
15. In Korea, since the 1960s, as the foreign trade sector has grown faster than the economy as a whole, foreign
trade dependency, or the ratio of total trading volume to Gross National Product, has increased drastically. The Korean
economy's trade dependency, particularly export dependency, has increased more substantially than import
dependency, which had increased rapidly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, from 21.3% in 1965 to 67.4% in 1975. The
ratio reached and stayed well over 60% during the 1980s and was at 65.5% in 1999. See Korean Social Science Data
Center, at http://www.ksdc.re.kr (last visited Oct. 9, 2001) (in Korean) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
16. In Korea, the main items of exportation have changed first from the primary industry to the light industry,
and subsequently to the heavy chemical industry. In 1962, Korea's major exports were composed entirely of raw
materials, minerals, lumber, and agricultural and fishing goods. In 1971, 68% of Korea's exports were composed of
textiles and other light industry goods, reflecting the nation's push into light industry. BYUNG HONG PARK, MODERN
KOREA'S FOREIGN TRADE 148 (1983) (in Korean) 4o, 18 - E-. By 1981, electronic products, steel
products, and footwear together made up 24% of exports, while textiles declined to 30%, and raw materials virtually
disappeared from the major items of export. See KOREA INTERNATIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATION, KOREA TRADE
YEARBOOK (in Korean) t - V A, ON cd]" 618-25 (1982). In 2000, electronic goods were Korea's single
largest export (36%) as the nation moved more firmly into higher-value-added production. See Korea National
Statistical Office, Exports and Imports by SKTC, -'RA 19, -a- 1 available at http://www.nso.go.kr (last visited
Oct. 9, 2001) (in Korean) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
17. For example, Korea has used provisions of the Foreign Trade Act to restrict imports and exports when it
believed that it was being treated unfairly by counterpart countries with respect to international transactions. Foreign
Trade Act, Law No. 3895 (1986), amended by Law No. 6417 (2001), art. 5 (in Korean) [hereinafter Foreign Trade
Act] r 9.- Q .This provision seems to be similar to Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 in that if a
foreign government maintains unreasonable or unjustifiable restrictions against an export of the United States, then the
United States Trade Representative is supposed to take retaliatory action against the offending countries. However, it is
very difficult for Korea to take retaliatory measures against partner countries engaging in unfair trade treatment,
because it has a small, open economy compared with the countries such as the United States.
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Safeguards Against Injury to Domestic Industries (hereinafter, Act on the
Investigation),"s and the emergency duties system of the Customs Tariff Act.'9 The
safeguard system is a system demanding urgent measures because it is operated when
a domestic industry faces serious injury due to a rapid increase in the importation of
goods that are similar or directly competitive with those produced domestically.
Particularly in the case of Korea, the existing adjustment duties ° alone cannot
avoid injury to its domestic industry because 91.2 percent of the imported goods of
Korea that are listed as Harmonized System (hereinafter HS)21 items are bound to
18. Act on the Investigation of Unfair International Trade Practices and Safeguards Against Injury to Domestic
Industries, Law No. 6417 (2001) (in Korean) [hereinafter Act on the Investigation] ---- ]L7-A--,L±_
oJ-14-;40] .- -i. The purpose of the Act, the special law governing the investigation on the international
unfair trade practices and the industries injury relief is to contribute to development of national economy by
establishing a fair transaction order and to enforce the international agreement on trade including WTO agreements.
Before the Act was established in 2001, the provisions about the industrial injury relief system were incorporated in
the Foreign Trade Act, the general law governing foreign trade in Korea. The purpose of the Foreign Trade Act is to
contribute to development of a strong economy by achieving a balance of international payments, increasing
international transactions through promotion of trade, and establishing a fair transaction order. The basic principle of
the Foreign Trade Act is to promote free and fair trade under the conditions prescribed by valid treaties, other
international agreements, and generally approved international laws. Under the Act, when necessary to restrict
international trade, the government should apply such restrictions during a limited period of time and only to the extent
necessary to obtain the restrictions' objectives. Foreign Trade Act, supra note 17, arts. 1, 3. The Minister of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy is ultimately responsible for trade administration, and is given certain discretion in
taking measures to promote and regulate foreign trade. Id. art. 5.
19. Customs Act, Law No. 1976 (1967), amended by Law No. 6305 (2000) (in Korean) [hereinafter Customs
Act] 5--',i] V. The Customs Act seeks to secure revenues through the imposition and collection of reasonable customs
taxes and proper clearance of imported and exported goods. The Minister of Finance and Economy is in charge of
customs administration. The main provisions of the Act are related to the imposition, collection, and reduction of
duties, the exemption from duties, the regulation of bonded transportation and storage, customs clearance, and
customhouse brokerage. See id. art. 1; see also National Government Organization Act, Law No. 2437 (1973),
amended by Law No. 6400 (2001), art. 27(7) (in Korean) --- 'If.
20. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 69 (in Korean) - Ail V. In order to protect related industries, adjustment
duties may be levied when, as a result of change in tariff classification, there is an increased importation of goods.
Generally, adjustment duties can be imposed up to 100% of dutiable value of the goods.
21. See Harmonized Comodity Description and Coding System, at http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/trade/HS.
html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating as follows:
The Harmonized System is an international six-digit commodity classification developed under
the auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council. Individual countries have extended it to ten
digits for customs purposes, and to 8 digits for export purposes. In the Harmonized System
goods are classified by what they are, and not according to their stage of fabrication, their use,
or origin. The Harmonized System nomenclature is logically structured by economic activity or
component material. For example, animals and animal products are found in one section; and
machinery and mechanical appliances which are grouped by function are found in another. The
nomenclature is divided into 21 sections. Each of these sections groups together goods
produced in the same sector of the economy. Each section comprises one or more chapters,
with the entire nomenclature being composed of 97 chapters. Some chapters are reserved for
future use. Chapters of sections I to XV (except section XI) are grouped by biological benus
or by the component material from which articles are made. For those chapters in which goods
are grouped by raw material, a vertical structure is used in which articles are often classified
according to their degree of processing. For example, Chapter 44 contains items such as rough
wood, wood roughly squared and some wooden finished products such as wooden tableware.
Articles may also be classified according to the use or function. This classification (i.e. by
function), mainly occurs in section XII and sections XVI-XXI. For example, section XVII
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WTO concession tariff rates. 2 Therefore, Korea needs to take the additional measureslaunched by the safeguard system as well as the emergency duties system.
A. Organizations in Charge
1. Trade Commission
The Trade Commission, a quasi-independent deliberative organ under the
umbrella of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy was inaugurated in July
1987 based on the provisions of the Act on the Investigation.23 The Trade Commission
conducts investigations with regard to industrial injury caused by the importation of
certain goods, recommends relief measures, and examines the system of international
trade laws.24 Although the trade commission is under the umbrella of the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy, it is considered by the Korean government to
perform not only fairly independent duties assigned by the Act on the Investigation,
but also quasi-judicial investigations and judgments concerning injury to domestic
industry.2'
The Trade Commission comprises one re-appointable chairman with a three-year
term and a nine-person commission that includes one permanent member. 6 The
members, who are appointed by the President of Korea upon recommendation of the
contains chapters 88 (aircraft) and 89 (ships)).
22. Yu KEuN SHIN, WTO AND THE MAJOR COUNTRIES' SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM 144 (1997) (in Korean) 9]Ail. 1 R71-AJ1V.
23. The provision about the Trade Commission in the Foreign Trade Act has been modified and moved into
The Provision in the Foreign Trade Act in 2001, r9--. q . See Foreign Trade Act, supra note 17, arts. 26-38 (in
Korean) (detailing the provision about the Trade Commission).
24. See Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 28 (in Korean) -- ;- ]-A1 .. ] 3
h-1 -i 3. II -9(noting that the Trade Commission has the following functions:
a) Investigating and judging the injury to a domestic industry due to rapid increase in
importation and proposing relief measures;
b) Investigating and judging the injury to a domestic industry caused by importing subsidized
goods or by dumping;
c) Investigating and judging the injury to a domestic industry caused by rapid increase in
distribution services provided by foreigners, and proposing relief measures against the
injury;
d) Investigating and analysing the influence of imports on the competitiveness of domestic
industries;
e) Studying international trade laws, systems, and cases of competition;
f) Investigating, deciding and imposing sanctions against unfair international transactions;
g) General investigations and proposals concerning fair trade practices).
25. There is no explicit provision about the binding power of the Trade Commission, but it was made explicit
during the process of interpellation and reply in the 131st session of the National Assembly. Additionally, the binding
power is confirmed by the general construction of the relevant provisions of the Act on the Investigation. See id. arts.
37-43; see also Eun Sup Lee, Regulation of Foreign Trade in Korea, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 150, n. 88
(1996) [hereinafter Regulation of Foreign Trade in Korea]; Regulation of International Trade in Korea, supra note 9,
at 523.
26 Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 29 (in Korean) -1- Z _@ . ]
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Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy,27 include persons well experienced in
industry and trade.2 As of 2001, the Trade Commission includes one chairman, one
permanent member, six regular members, and about forty employees assigned to one
division29 and four departments.0
2. Deliberative Committee on Tariffs
The Deliberative Committee on Tariffs has its legal basis in the Customs Act3' and
is a non-permanent advisory organization with twenty members,32 including the
chairman, who is the high-ranking official in the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
The Committee deliberates matters pertaining to the operation of the anti-dumping
duties system as well as other details of customs tariff policies, as deemed necessary
by the Minister of Finance and Economy." Therefore, this committee is simply a
deliberative organ that is not binding on the Minister, and is completely different from
the Trade Commission in terms of its independence. For instance, half of the members
of this committee are public officials appointed by the Minister of Finance and
Economy. When the Trade Commission determines an industrial injury to be serious
due to a rapid increase in imports, the Deliberative Committee on Tariffs evaluates
customs tariff measures as safeguards3 4
B. Operation Requirements and Judgment Criteria
A petition for investigation of industrial injury due to a surge in imports may be
filed when the importation of specific goods or the supply of distribution services by
foreigners causes serious injury to the domestic industry.35 The requirements for the
imposition of safeguards include a rapid increase in import quantity, the existence of
serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic industry, and a causal
relationship between the increase in imports and the industrial injury. 6
27. Id. (in Korean),.*-:- R iA] I._ °111 , -?- ]- -il 3..1-V .
28. Even in a case where the chairman and members are not public officials, they shall be considered public
officials in the application of relevant provisions of the Criminal Code and other laws and regulations.
29. The Trade Research Office of the Trade Commission performs functions such as the investigation of
injuries to domestic industries and the study of international trade law systems.
30. These include the Department of General Investigation, Department of Investigation into Injurious Effect,
the Department of Investigation into Unfair Trade, and the Department of Investigation into Import Price.
31. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 13 (in Korean) -UlAl 19.
32. The Committee's twenty members consist of administrative officials, researchers or practitioners, with deep
knowledge about trade and tariffs. Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, President Decree No. 17166 (2001), art. 4
(in Korean) [hereinafter Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act] 3,A1]]1 ,] -4 1, .
33. Id. art. 4(l) (in Korean) 4_111 SN] .
34. See id. arts. 4-26 (1), (2) (in Korean) 11 d Al- 11.
35. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, arts. 15(1), 22(1) (in Korean) *Z. 7 .33qa -l' o q
36. Id. (in Korean) o -- -. _
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The meaning of "increase in imports" is specified in Article XIX of GATT 1994"7
and in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards.38 As in the cases of other
countries,39 the term should be construed here to include both absolute and relative40
increases in imports. However, in the case of a relative increase in imports,4' the
imposition of safeguards will be fairly restricted due to difficulty showing causation
between the increase in imports and the resultant injury, and also because the
exporting countries may possibly require immediate compensation or impose
retaliation.
The domestic industry refers to the producers that account for a considerable
portion of the total national production, or the national producers who produce articles
like or directly competitive with the specific imports. In cases where domestic
37. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XIX, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (noting
that an increase in imports can be said to occur in one of two ways under the WTO provisions: (1) The absolute
volume of imports may increase or (2) the import share of the domestic market may increase, even though the total
volume of imports declines); see also JACKSON ET AL., LEGALPROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 612 (explaining that GAT
1994 Article XIX requires that imports be in increased quantities, but earlier GATT materials suggested that the
increase may be relative).
38. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 2(1) (stating that "[a] Member may apply a safeguard
measure ... if... such product is being imported ... in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic
production...").
39. The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) "usually interpreted the U.S. Statute as not
requiring an absolute increase, though some Commissioners quarrelled with this view. [Internationally, the] Uruguay
Round Agreement on Safeguards resolves the matter conclusively for GAT'r purposes in paragraph 2, which indicates
that an increase in the market share of imports will suffice." JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note I, at 612.
Concerning the term "increased imports,"
Section 201(a) of the [Trade Act of 1974] merely states that the articles involved must be
imported in "increased quantities." On its face, that would appear to require an absolute
increase. However, Section 202(c)(1)(C) provides that in making its determination, the
Commission shall take into account "an increase in imports (either actual or relative to domestic
production) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic
producers." Accordingly, it is clear that Congress intended that this criterion for relief is
satisfied if imports have increased either absolutely or relatively compared to domestic
production. This interpretation of the statute is confirmed by legislative history...
BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAw 735-36 (1991). That is,
[Tihe House version of the bill that became the Trade Act of 1974 provided that the
Commission could take into account either absolute or relative increases in imports. The Senate
version required an absolute increase, however, and in this connection the Senate Finance
Committee said, "The House bill would require the Commission to take into account, among
other things, whether there is either an absolute or a relative increase in imports; § 201(b)(2)(C)
[present 202(c)(2)(C)] of the Committee bill would require the Commission to consider only
whether there is an absolute increase in imports, as well as a decline in the proportion of the
domestic market supplied by domestic producers..." S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
121 (1974). In the conference between the House and the Senate to resolve their differences in
the 1974 Act, the Senate retreated from this amendment, and the House version became law.
Id. at 736 n. 3 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974)).
40. See Regulation ofInternational Trade in Korea, supra note 9, at 522 (observing that in Korea, the term has
been construed to mean that the absolute increase in imports is absolutely larger than that of the domestic production,
and that the relative increase in import is relatively larger than that of the domestic production).
41. An increase in imports is regarded as a more important required condition for safeguards measures,
particularly when the importing countries are in commercial depression.
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manufacturers are producing articles concurrently with importation of the same article,
any domestically manufactured portions as well as the article like or directly
competitive with the imported article could fall within the scope of domestic
industry.42
The terms "serious injury" and the "threat of serious injury" come from Article
XIX of GATT 1994 ' and Article 4 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards. 44
When serious injury is charged, consideration is given to any significant impact on:
domestic production facilities, the level of profits maintained by the companies
concerned, domestic sales, unemployment, decreases in market share, increases in
inventory, or decreases in production profit of the domestic industry, to name a few.45
'"Threat of serious injury" exists when serious injury, although not yet existing, is
46imminent.
42. See GATT 1994 art. XIX (requiring that the increased imports injure producers of "like or directly
competitive products," which is language that carries over into the Uruguay Round Agreement). The same requirement
appears in United States law. The concept of like products is found in other GAIT provisions, such as Articles III and
VI, but the addition of the words "directly competitive" suggests that a more expansive definition is intended in Article
XIX. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., LEGALPROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 616 (indicating that the mere fact that an industry
is seriously injured by imports is evidence that it produces "directly competitive products").
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards provides that a "domestic industry" shall be understood to mean
the producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive products operating within the territory of a major
proportion of the total domestic production of those products. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 4(1)(c).
43. See GATT 1994 art. XIX l(a) (stating that "[i]f... under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers ... ").
44. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 4(l)(a),(b) (providing that "serious injury" shall be
understood to mean a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry, and "threat of serious
injury" shall be understood to mean serious injury that is clearly imminent). A determination of the existence of a
threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture, or remote possibility. Id.
45. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, Decree No. 17222 (2001), art. 17(2) (in Korean)
[hereinafter Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation] -'-7--7 - 41i iL71 O 3.9
@,A, Z V. Escape clause relief is permissible under GAIT and United States law only if the increased imports cause
or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. Concerning the injury test for relief measures in dumping
and subsidies cases, the domestic industry must be materially injured-a test thought to be easier to meet than serious
injury. For United States law, see JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 622 (detailing the Trade Act of
1974 § 202(c)(1)(A)).
46. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 17(3) (in Korean) *-9 o1*-
d M.451-] A -. Concerning the factors to evaluate in determining "serious injury" or
"threat of serious injury," the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards illustrates the rate and amount of the increase
in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased
imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and
employment. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 4(2)(a).
For the case of the United States, see 19 U.S.C.A. § 2252(c)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (1990). Regarding prudent evaluation
of the threat of serious injury, the United States Senate Finance Committee stated that the existence of any of those
factors, such as the growth in inventory, would not itself be relevant to the threat of injury from imports if it resulted
from conditions unrelated to imports. Such conditions could arise from a variety of other causes, such as changes in
technology or in consumer tastes, domestic competition from substitute products, plant obsolescence, or poor
management. The Committee intends the threat of serious injury to be present when serious injury, although not yet
existing, is clearly imminent if import trends continue unabated. See BRUCE. E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 740 n.6
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 571, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1973); S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1974)); see also
JACKSON ETAL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 626.
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C. Investigation Procedure
1. Petition for Investigation
Regarding the initiation of an escape clause proceeding, the chief administrative
official of the domestic industry or any person who has an interest in the
corresponding domestic industry, is eligible to petition for investigation into an
industrial injury.47 Complainants who may have interests in the corresponding industry
include: labour unions; associations of manufacturers; and manufacturers who account
for more than twenty percent of the total production amount or the number of
companies,48 but are producers who have more than five employees in the cases of
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.49 The latter complainant provision is distinctive
compared with that of other countries such as the United States or the EU. The Act on
the Investigation does not, however, include parliament or the President as qualified
petitioners seemingly because the Trade Commission of Korea is not formally
independent of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy. 0
A complainant who petitions for investigation of industrial injury must submit the
required documentary evidence and the application form along with additional items
specified in the investigation regulations of the Trade Commission." Among the
47. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 15 (in Korean) -- -61'- .. j'i_
48. In the case of the United States, the statute provides that a petition may be filed by an entity which
represents an industry including a trade association, firm, certified or recognized union, or a group of workers.
Concerning the meaning of the term "representative of an industry," at least one commentator has argued, however,
that to be representative of an industry:
[A] petitioner must not only be a member of the industry, but also that firms accounting for
more than 50 percent of the domestic production of the article involved must support the
petition. The Commission has not decided whether the term "representative" as used in the
statute means only (1) that the petitioner is similar in a sampling sense to the other firms in the
industry, or (2) that the petitioner has the consent of a majority of other producers to act, in
effect, as their agent in filing the petition. Nonetheless, a prospective petitioner is very wise to
persuade as many as possible of the other firms in the industry to join in the petition because the
Commission is reluctant to institute an investigation unless the petition has broad support within
the industry.
BRUCE. E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 756-57.
49. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 14(1) (in Korean) - -
911 -q -41%,1- i d j1 41 1 A] Ol X - A,1 W.
50. In the United States:
[Ain escape clause case may be initiated at the request of the President, the Trade
Representative, the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, or by
the Commission on its own motion, as well as by complaint from an interested party. There is no
record of the Commission ever initiating such an investigation on its own motion, but
occasionally investigations are initiated at the request of one of the Congressional Committees
or the President.
BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 755.
51. A complainant shall submit a petition in which the following matters are specified, along with necessary
documentary evidence:
a) Names, specifications, properties, and uses of the goods involved and the names of
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documents provided, those that are submitted on a confidential basis may not be open
to the public without clear consent of the document provider.52 In such case, the Trade
Commission may not demand the confidential documents, but only the summary
report.
3
2. Execution of the Investigation
When a petition of investigation of industrial injury is filed with the Trade
Commission, the Commission must decide within thirty days whether or not it will
initiate an investigation.: 4 However, the Trade Commission may not initiate an
investigation in the following types of cases: when the petitioner does not comply with
the requirements concerning the qualification; when it is not found that the domestic
industry is or is likely to be threatened by the import of specific goods based on a
review of the petition and the documentary evidence (i.e., lack of causation); and
when it is unnecessary to initiate the investigation because relief measures were taken
already.55
producers,
b) Exporter, importer, import record (volume and value), and estimated import amount for a
specified period regarding the goods involved,
c) Names, specifications, properties, uses of like of directly competitive domestic products,
and the names of producers,
d) Circumstances in which the domestic industry is materially injured by reason of imports of
the goods concerned, etc., or is threatened with material injury;
e) Descriptions and the degree of the support the domestic industry concerned is receiving
under laws and regulations concerning assistance of industry;
f) Type, degree, and duration of action requested for the relief of the domestic industry
concerned.
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 15(1) (in Korean) - -'-4
V] 1 O 1hkoil - t] IN . -' A] 4 . In the United States,
The regulations state that the petition must contain 'specific information in support of the claim
that an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a
substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an
article like or directly competitive with the imported article...'
BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 758 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 206.14 (1990)). These elements are almost the same as
those provided by the Act on the Investigation of Korea, except that the U.S. regulations require a statement
concerning efforts made by firms and workers in the domestic industry to compete more effectively with the imported
article, whereas such a statement is not required by the Korean Act.
52. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 3(2) (stating that "[a]ny information which is by nature
confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall, upon cause being shown, be treated as such by the
competent authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without permission of the party submitting it ... ").
53. See Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, at 25(1) (in Korean)
--a 7 t] i Pr q -1 -MM- _ ) 5 AJ 4-'1 3t] IWE.A -1 i ; see also Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art.
3(2) (stating that ". .. [p]arties providing confidential information may be requested to furnish non-confidential
summaries thereof or, if such parties indicate that such information cannot be summarized, the reasons why a summary
cannot be provided ... ").
54. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 5(3) (in Korean) -- -- -4 '1 1 Z.
55. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 16(1) (in Korean)
3_3-7 - t Pd
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Once the Trade Commission initiates an investigation, it then forms an
investigation team consisting of the Commission itself, the officials of the
administrative organ who exercise jurisdiction over the industry concerned, officers or
employees of government-funded research institutes and of associations of the
businessmen concerned, and other specialists in industry, trade, and international
economics." After the team is chosen, it conducts the investigation by consulting
sources such as surveys, hearings from surveyors, administrative organs or research
institutes concerned, and on-the-spot examinations. "The investigation must be
finalized within sixty days of its initiation." However, when the contents of the
investigation are very complicated, or a postponement of the investigation is requested
with good reason, the deadline may be extended up to 120 additional days. 9
If the interested parties come to revoke the petition while the investigation is in
process, the investigation is terminated. o Additionally, if the investigation team
recognizes that without urgent action the industry subject to the investigation may
suffer irreparable harm, provisional relief measures may be recommended to the head
of the administrative agency concerned. 6, The conference held by the Trade
Commission is open to the public in principle, except when it is necessary to protect
public interests or trade secrets.62 Judgment is passed by a majority vote of the
Commission.63
3. Relief Measures
Within one month of the date of a decision concerning an industrial injury, the
Trade Commission can recommend that the head of the administrative agency
concerned take relief measures for a designated period of time. Based on the
recommendations, the head of the administrative agency concerned finalizes the relief
measures. The relief measures may be as follows:
a) regulations on the quantity of imports;
b) adjustment of customs tariff rates;
c) various assistance measures to relieve industrial injury or to
promote the structural adjustment of the domestic industries
concerned such as:
56. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 37(1) (in Korean) - q I M- Al._ ] 11 11
57. Id. art. 36 (in Korean) - - -
58. Id. art. 16 (in Korean) -- - -- ,- .] _ '7]°11"- .
59. Id. (in Korean) -V" o g-P A od A.._ it] oil4-0. 1 -l .
60. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 16(3) (in Korean) .ZL7C Veo
61. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 18(1) (in Korean) - o- t]A- ±_° 5 L~]]oMr .
62. Id. art. 33(1) (in Korean) " - I--' _ - 0. ] il- Pd" -Oi.t
63. Id. art. 32 (in Korean) -9 ' 7- _ ---
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(i) financial assistance measures;
(ii) re-education of the employees in the domestic industries;
(iii) assistance measures to promote technology and
productivity."
The head of the related administrative organ must decide within forty-five days of
the Trade Commission's suggestions whether or not the relief measures will be
implemented.6 During this time, the head must evaluate the impact of the relief
measures on international trade relationships and the domestic economy through
hearing from the other head of the related administrative organ.6 The head of the
64. ld. art. 17(1) (in Korean) I]'-,-- . Enforcement Decree of the
Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 18 (in Korean) -. ,
I] I i. The United States International Trade Commission may make the following recommendations after an
affirmative injury determination:
(A) an increase in, or the imposition of, any duty on the imported article;
(B) a tariff-rate quota on the article;
(C) a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of the
article;
(D) one or more appropriate adjustment measures, including the provision of trade adjustment
assistance;
(E) any combination of the actions described above.
19 U.S.C.A. § 2252(e)(2) (1990). These measures recommended by the United States International Trade Commission
are not so different from those provided in the Act on the Investigation of Korea. In the United States, however, the
President in charge of implementation of the relief measures is required to take all appropriate and feasible actions.
Trade Act of 1974, as amended § 202(a), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2253(a)(1)(A) (1990). Under the Act, the remedies open to the
President include a range of options. He can increase duties, impose tariff rate quotas or quantitative restrictions, enter
into "agreements" with exporting nations (subject to GATT (1994) discipline after the Uruguay Round), and take any
other action within the Presidential power, or any combination of the above. The President also has broad discretion to
impose as large a trade restriction as he considers necessary to achieve the purpose of Section 201 of the 1974 Trade
Act. JACKSON Er AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 643; BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 768-69.
65. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 19(1) (in Korean) "--7o4-- I -z .A] 011
66. See id. art. 19(2) (in Korean) - see also 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 2253(A)(2) (1990) (stating that:
In determining what action to take... the [U.S.] President shall take into account-
(A) the recommendation and report of the International Trade Commission,
(B) the extent to which workers and firms in the domestic industry are-
(i) benefiting from adjustment assistance and other manpower programs, and
(ii) engaged in worker retraining efforts;
(C) the efforts being made, or to be implemented, by the domestic industry (including the
efforts included in any adjustment plan or commitment submitted to the Commission
under section 201(b) to make a positive adjustment to import competition;
(D) the probable effectiveness of the actions authorized under paragraph (3) to facilitate
positive adjustment to import competition;
(E) the short- and long-term economic and social costs of the actions authorized under
paragraph (3) relative to their short- and long-term economic and social benefits and other
considerations relative to the position of the domestic industry in the United States
economy;
(F) other factors related to the national economic interest of the United States, including, but
not limited to-
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related administrative organ should also review the effectiveness of the relief
measures from the date of implementation. Based on this analysis, the corresponding
measures may be phased down, extended, or cancelled by the Trade Commission."
D. Emergency Duties System
The Emergency Duties System aims to protect the domestic industry by promptly
addressing changes in the international economic environment.
Namely, when the domestic industry is seriously injured or threatened to be
seriously injured by rapid increases in import, emergency duties can be levied to
protect the domestic industry without the long and cumbersome process of
modification of the law. 8 The emergency duties may be deemed necessary to prevent
or control serious injury on two conditions. First, an investigation should confirm that
the particular domestic industry which is like or directly competitive with the imports
is, in fact, seriously injured or threatened to be seriously injured by the rapid increase
in imports. Second, it should be worthwhile to protect the corresponding industry.69
During the process of safeguard investigation under the provisions of the Act on
the Investigation, provisional emergency duties may be levied on the article that is
being considered for emergency duties or on the imports against which provisional
measures are suggested.70 Provisional emergency duties shall be imposed as necessary
before completion of the investigation when it is recognized that an irretrievable
injury may occur unless such a provisional measure is urgently taken, even while the
investigation is in process.7 The customs tariff rate is set to relieve or control the
(i) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by taxpayers, communities,
and workers if import relief were not provided under this chapter,
(ii) the effect of the implementation of actions under this section on consumers and on
competition in domestic markets for articles, and
(iii) the impact on United States industries and firms as a result of international
obligations regarding compensation;
(G) the extent to which there is diversion of foreign exports to the United States market by
reason of foreign restraints;
(H) the potential for circumvention of any action taken under this section;
(I) the national security interests of United States; and
(J) the factors required to be considered by the Commission ...
In the United States, the factors used to determine what actions are to be taken are more detailed than in Korea.
67. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 20(1) (in Korean) - 1-47RV)- M1 1]
'.1 01] 1 -I_ --. Regarding duration and review of safeguard measures, the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Safeguards art. 7(4) provides that in order to facilitate adjustment in a situation where the expected duration of a
safeguard measure is over one year, the member applying the measure shall progressively liberalize it at regular
intervals during the period of application and shall, if appropriate, withdraw it or increase the pace of liberalization.
The degressivity provision in the Act on the Investigation comes from the above Agreement. Enforcement Decree of
the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 19(3) (in Korean).
68. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 65(1) (in Korean) -441] .
69. Id. (in Korean) 4A1 I.
70. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 18 (in Korean) -3 o --- ,-0t1Ol1Aol 6.
71. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 66(1) (in Korean) -*1A- t .
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serious injury, and is applied preferentially over the WTO concession tariff rates.72
The Minister of Economy and Finance re-examines the decision to levy
emergency duties when necessary. Based on the re-examination, the details of the
decision may be altered. In such a case, the altered measures may not be more rigid
than the original ones.73
According to the provisions of the WTO Safeguard Agreement, the duration of
emergency duties and provisional emergency duties may not exceed four years74 and
two hundred days,75 respectively. Even when the duration is extended based on re-
examination, the total duration of implementation including emergency duties,
provisional emergency duties, and import quantity restrictions may not exceed eight
years.76 The aforementioned regulations of the WTO Safeguard Agreement concerning
provisional safeguard measures, duration, and review of the safeguard measures are
stipulated accordingly in the Customs Act of Korea.77
III. ALTERNATIVES TO IMPROVE KOREA' S SAFEGUARD SYSTEM
A. Qualification of Petitioners
The WTO Safeguard Agreement does not stipulate the qualification of
petitioners.7" Korea's safeguard system classifies qualified petitioners into two groups:
persons interested in the domestic industry included or the heads of the administrative
agencies concerned.
The Act on the Investigation needs to be revised to authorize Congress to request
that the Trade Commission apply safeguard measures as in the United States.79
However, in the case of Korea, because the Trade Commission belongs to the Ministry
72. In Korea, the adjustment customs tariff system is similar to the emergency customs tariff rate system.
However, there are two differences between the two systems. First, the former can be implemented for less than six
months with renewals to protect small- and medium-sized industry and agriculture injured by a rapid increase in
import. In the case of necessity, it could be levied without investigation by the Trade Commission. The latter can be
imposed for not more than 4 years (in case of the provisional measures, 200 days) to protect the domestic industries
concerned in accordance with the determination in an injury investigation. Second, the former must be levied within
the WTO concession tariff rates, while the latter may be levied beyond the concession tariff rates.
73. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 67 (in Korean) -*A 1.
74. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 7(1).
75. Id. art. 6.
76. Id. art. 7(3).
77. Customs Act, supra note 19, arts. 65, 66, 67 (in Korean) 3--Ai .
78. There is no provision concerning qualified petitioners in the WTO Safeguard Agreement, which seems to
reflect the urgent necessities of the safeguard measures. For example, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of GATr 1994 stipulates that an investigation shall not be initiated unless the authorities have determined, on the basis
of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the application expressed by domestic producers of the
like product, that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. The application shall be
considered to have been made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry" if it is supported by those domestic producers
representing more than 50% of total production. However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers
account for less than 25% of total production. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, art. 5.4.
79. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, the Commission may have difficulty providing
an objective solution due to its lack of complete independence. Therefore, the
authority to petition for safeguard measures should be given to Congress after the
Trade Commission can impartially exercise its quasi-judicial power, which should
materialize in the near future.
In order to restrict vexatious or indiscreet petitions, the Act on the Investigation
requires that petitioners represent a minimum portion of the total amount of domestic
production or the total number of domestic producers. 0 For the same purpose, the Act
on the Investigation also provides that the Trade Commission shall not commence a
second escape clause investigation of the same subject matter unless one year has
passed since the previous investigation, except for good cause.8 ' Requiring petitions to
demonstrate support by a substantial number of the companies or workers in the
industry are desirable. In this sense, the petitioner acts like a class action
representative. While it is not necessary for all concerned parties in the industry to
support the petition, a substantial proportion must support it, for the provisions of the
Act are focused upon industry-wide relief. Additionally, it is advisable to stipulate
that when a petitioner is disqualified while a safeguard measure is being operated, the
safeguard measure in operation may be terminated by the Trade Commission or by re-
examination requested by the interested parties. Finally, the Trade Commission itself
should actively petition for investigation of an industrial injury83 in the event the
product concerned is monopolized by a large company in importation, and the
medium and small-sized companies that have subcontracts with the monopolistic
company are reluctant to file their industrial injuries, no matter how serious.
B. Definition of the Domestic Industry
As explained previously, in Korea, the domestic industry is defined as the
producers that account for a considerable portion of the total national production, or as
the national producers who produce articles like or directly competitive with the
specific import." When a domestic producer imports and produces more than one kind
of product, the portion that is produced domestically and subject to petition is
considered part of the "domestic industry."'
When an industry is regionally dispersed, there may be a controversy regarding
80. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 14 (in Korean) * -;9-L-P
-,lw A 1 -*t-4 1 -A .83 U01.
81. Id. arts. 16(1), 17(1) (in Korean) *0 -7- A'q 1q l t *,"1 i-,i .A e.
82. 1 RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAcrlONS 313 (1996)
[hereinafter FOLsOM & GORDON].
83. For the case of the United States, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
84. See supra Part II.B (defining "domestic industry"); see also Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art.
4(1)(c) (defining a domestic industry to mean the producers as a whole of the like or directly competitive products
operating within the territory of a Member, or those whose collective output of the like or directly competitive
products constitutes a major proportion).
85. Yu KEUN SHIN, supra note 22, at 55-56 (in Korean) -q- -, WTO -- -'..-.I Al o] _7]..
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the range of the domestic industry (i.e., whether or not a regionally dispersed industry
can be classified as part of the domestic industry). 6 In the case of Korea, arguing
about the regional industry issue is not fruitful because Korea is geographically small
and unified. Therefore, Korea does not have a "regional industry."
Another issue related to the range of domestic industry is whether or not
"domestic industry" should be construed to include producers who have special
relationships with the importers or exporters of the petitioned goods through financial
joint-venture or remuneration agreements. Conforming to the globalization trends in
foreign investment, the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act (the Act on the
Investigation), which was modified in 1993, repealed the provision that producers
with special relationships such as foreign investors8 and special related parties"
should be excluded from the definition of "domestic industry." 9 The anti-dumping
duties provision also does not exclude "the producers who have special relationships
with the importers or exporters of the petitioned goods through financial joint-venture
or remuneration agreements" from the category of domestic industry, reflecting the
provision of the Agreement on Implementation of Article XII of the GATT 1994,9'
86. See, e.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, art. 4.1(ii) (providing with
respect to regional industry that:
[Trhe territory of a Member may... be divided into two or more .... if (a) the producers within
such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market,
and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the
product in question located elsewhere in the territory).
87. Considering the provisions of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act that liberalize almost all kinds of foreign
business as of 2001, foreign investors are difficult to exclude from domestic industry. Under the Foreign Capital
Inducement Act, Law No. 5559 (1998), amended by Law No. 6406 (2001), -q - .- 4- _1 .In principle, foreign
investment is permitted in all industries except those specifically identified as "restricted" or "prohibited" from foreign
investment. Currently, foreign capital may be induced with the following exceptions:
1) In the case of risking the safety of the nation and the maintenance of public order;
2) In the case of endangering the sound development of the national economy; and
3) In the case of violating the law of Korea. Regarding the national treatment, foreign
investors shall be treated as nationals of Korea with regard to their business except where
the laws specify otherwise.
Also, provisions of the laws relating to tax exemptions or to reductions applicable to a national of Korea shall
also apply equally to foreign investors except where the laws specify otherwise. Id. art. 5; Enforcement Decree of the
Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Decree No. 15931 (1998), amended by Decree No. 17137 (2001), art. 7(2) (in
Korean) -q - 1-* 1 - A 1 i4, .
88. According to the WTO Safeguard Agreement as well as legislation in the United States, Canada, and the
EU, the special related parties specified in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, art. 15(4),
and the Customs Act of Korea, art. 51, are not excluded from domestic industry, 3A]l 'A. Therefore, these parties can
be considered as members of the domestic industry, reflecting the trends embodied in multilateral agreements. See,
e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Preamble (stating its desire "... to promote the expansion and
progressive liberalization of world trade and to facilitate investment across international frontier ... "); see also
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 1I (in Korean).
89. Yu KEUN SHiN, l--a, supra note 22, at 151 (in Korean) .] -- l1 -21 Mol-_ .
90. Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, supra note 32, art. 27 (in Korean) --iJ- s ij 0.
91. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, art. 1(1) (providing for the customs value
of imported goods between the buyer and seller who are not related to each other); see also id. art. 15(4) (explaining
that persons are considered to be related only if:
(a) they are officers or directors of one another's businesses;
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which is reflected also by the related provisions of the United states and EU.
Considering all of these conditions, no restrictions may be established against foreign
investors or special related parties in filing the petition. However, when the petition is
finalized leading to an ultimate judgment, an in-depth examination should be
conducted to consider defining the range of "domestic industry."
When the industry simply assembles imported parts, however, it is somewhat
questionable that the industry should be considered as domestic 9, because of potential
difficulty determining which products are produced in Korea and which products are
not.93 Although industry such as assembling imported parts should not be sanctioned
upon application of the petition, the decision concerning the intensity of injury should
be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the correlation to related industries and
the domestic economy.
One issue regarding the definition of the "domestic industry" is whether it can
involve various stages of processing. In other words, the issue is whether the imports
must be at the same level of processing as the domestic industry. It should be
interpreted that various stages of processing could be considered in defining the
imported product. This has the practical effect of allowing the imported article to be at
(b) they are legally recognized partners in business;
(c) they are employer and employee;
(d) any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 percent or more of the
outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them;
(e) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other;
(f) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person;
(g) together they directly or indirectly control a third person; or
(h) they are members of the same family).
92. When the escape clause was first written into the trade laws just after World War II, the U.S. companies
typically produced most of their components themselves, and there was no problem about the imported component
issue.
93. See BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 751-52 (describing one U.S. case where the parties advocated 5
different tests for determining the domestic industry in the case of assembling imported parts). The tests were
described as follows:
1) "Substantial change" test-comparison of the product before and after each stage of the
U.S. production process to determine what changes have been made.
2) "Value-added" or "domestic content" test-analysis of the percentage of U.S. components
and labor added to the imported articles;
3) "Major component" test-determination that the finished product comes from the country
supplying the essential element;
4) "Commitment to the U.S." test--evaluation of the firm's involvement in the U.S. based on
employment, domestic facilities, and capital; and
5) "Degree of control" test-evaluation of the firm's decision-making process focusing on
the authority exercised by the foreign firm's U.S. subsidiary over decisions affecting
domestic production.
Id. at 751 n. 15. The U.S.I.T.C. did not adopt any single test, but it considered elements of all 5 tests in making its
determination. The Commission considered the domestic vale added or the domestic content of the products, but
treated this as only one of several factors to be considered in making the domestic industry determination. It also
considered the amount of capital invested in U.S. production facilities, the number of persons employed in the United
States, and the nature of the domestic activities. Id. at 751-52.
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a different level of process from that which caused injury to the domestic industry.94
C. Investigation of Injurious Effect on Industry
The investigation should meet several execution requirements under the terms of
WTO Safeguard Agreements. First, it should be conducted with objectivity and
fairness. Second, it should be conducted with open procedure,95 objective evaluation, 6
and special treatment of confidential information. 97 The related stipulations98 of the
current Act on the Investigation seem to meet these requirements.
The Act on the Investigation stipulates the factors to be examined in making
determinations as to the injurious effects on industry as follows:
1. Whether import quantities or supplies of services by foreigners
have increased;
2. Whether there is a serious injury or threat thereof,
a) with respect to serious injury,99 whether there is a decline in
sales or market share, production, profit, or employment, a
decrease in operating rate, or a rise in inventory in the
domestic industry;'
b) with respect to the threat of serious injury, whether serious
injury determining with the above factors is clearly
imminent.' °
94. See FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 82, at 319 (stating that the U.S. International Trade Commission has
indicated in one case "that when several stages are involved in the production of goods, the domestic industry includes
the facilities involved in all of the various stages").
95. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 3(1).
96. Id. art. 4(2).
97. Il art. 3(2).
98. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, arts. 15-25 (in Korean) -
99. With respect to serious injury in the agricultural and fishery industries, the Notification of the Ministry
specifies with respect to serious injury as follows: a) whether there is a significant idling of cultivated land, or whether
there is a significant change of employment; b) whether there is a serious damage to the domestic industry due to the
income decrease of farmers and fishermen; c) whether there is significant underemployment within the domestic
industry. Furthermore, it specifies with respect to the threat of serious injury as follows: a) whether there is a decline in
production, sales as market share, or a rise in inventory and its cost, in the domestic industry; b) trends in production
and trade of related exporting countries. Notification of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, art. 2-11(1),
(2) (in Korean) A,! J-, L-V- Al.
100. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 17(1), (2) (in Korean) -0 o'
- -- - .In the United States, when determining serious injury, the
Commission is required to consider the significant idling of productive facilities, the inability of a significant number
of firms to carry out production at reasonable levels of profit, and significant unemployment or underemployment
within the industry when determining serious injury. 19 U.S.C.A § 2252(c) (2001). These factors are the same as those
required in Korea.
101. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 17(1), (3) (in Korean)
- -- .- Iz:] -'- - k . In the United States, when evaluating the threat of
serious injury, the Commission must consider the inadequacy of capital to finance modernization or maintain existing
expenditures for research and development, and the extent to which the United States is the focal point for a diversion
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The Act on the Investigation requires a causal relationship between the import
increase and the serious injury of domestic industry as a requirement for safeguard
measures. Thus, it fully reflects the provisions of the WTO Safeguard Agreements,102
which stipulate that the determination of whether or not the injury or the threat thereof
exists shall not be made unless the investigation demonstrates the objective evidence
of a causal link between increased imports of the products concerned and serious
injury or threat thereof. The U.S.Ir and EU14 regulations also put equal emphasis on
both the realized and the possibility of serious injury to prevent indiscreet operation of
safeguard measures taken against the threat of injury, which are in harmony with the
above provisions of the WTO Safeguard Agreement.
Herewith, a question might be raised about the intensity of the causal link between
the import increase and the injury or the threat of injury. Regarding this question, the
provision of the Act on the Investigation shall be construed to mean that the import
should be the most important cause when there are several factors affecting the
domestic industry. This corresponds to the provision of the United States Act of 1974,
which defines import increase as a cause which is important and not less than any
other cause,"5 and to the provision of the WTO Agreement, stipulating that when
of exports of other markets. Additionally, it must consider the factors stipulated in Korea's Act in the Investigation. 19
U.S.C.A. § 2252(c) (2001).
102. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 4(2)(b).
103. See Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994, art. 301(d) (2)(i) (stipulating with respect to the threat of
serious injury that "... there is clear evidence that increased imports (either actual or relative to domestic production)
of the article are substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article
lice or directly competitive with the imported article").
104. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 3285/94, arts. 6(1), 8(1) (stipulating that "[w]here after consultation
referred to in Article 3, it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation, the Commission shall (a) initiate an investigation. .. " and ". .. provisional safeguard measures shall be
applied:.., where a preliminary determination provides clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are
threatening to cause serious injury").
105. See BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 741-42 n. 4 (explaining that the House Ways and Means
Committee explained the meaning of the term "substantial cause" in its report on the 1974 [Trade] Act). The definition
was stated as follows:
The second major change is the substitution of "substantial cause" for "major cause." "Major"
has been understood to mean greater than all other factors combined. The bill defines
"substantial cause" as "a cause which is important and not less than any other cause." The
Committee intends that a dual test be met-imports must constitute an important cause and be
no less important than any other single cause. For example, if imports were just one of many
factors of equal weight, imports would meet the test of being "not less than any other cause,"
but it would be unlikely that any of the causes would be deemed an "important" cause. If there
were any other cause more important than imports, then the second test of being "not less than
any other cause" would not be met. On the other hand, if imports were one of two factors of
equal weight and there were no other factors, both tests would be met. H.R. Rep. No. 571, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1973). See also the Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1974 Act,
where the Finance Committee stated that the change to "substantial cause" was being made
because the "major cause" test of the 1962 Act "has proved in many cases to be an unreasonably
difficult standard to meet," and it was not intended that the escape clause criteria "go from one
extreme of excessive rigidity to complete laxity." S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sass. 120-21
(1974).
tL
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factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the
same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.1°
Some suggestions can be made to improve the investigation process. The
investigation criteria specified in the Act on the Investigation differ from the
categories of threat of injury used in other advanced countries, such as the United
States.'7 With respect to the investigation into threat of injury, the potential situation
needs to be considered in greater detail; however, in the escape clause proceedings in
the Act on the Investigation, there seems to be no difference between evaluating
potential and actual injury. Referring to the legislative cases in the United States'0 s and
the provisions of Korea's Customs Act,'O° investigation criteria in the Act on the
Investigation need to be expanded to include the following:
a) the rate of increase of the exports to Korea;
b) the extent to which firms in the domestic industry are unable to
generate adequate capital to finance the modernization of their
domestic plants and equipment, or are unable to maintain existing
levels of expenditures for research and development;
c) the extent to which there is diversion of foreign exports to the
Korean market by reason of foreign countries' restraints."0
Indiscreet applications may especially be followed by the trade disputes among the
trading partner countries.
D. Provisional Safeguard Measures
The Act on the Investigation regulates provisional safeguard measures,
reflecting the WTO safeguard measures." 2 The provisional safeguard measures are not
allowed to be in effect for more than two hundred days.' The provisional safeguard
measures lose effect when the head of the related administrative organ determines that
the industry is not seriously injured or when the regular safeguard measures take effect
based on a final decision. "1 The processing period of a provisional safeguard
measures' recommendation and enforcement for agricultural and manufactured
106. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 4(2)(b).
107. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, supra note 32, art. 63(2) (in Korean) -A1p I Al t .
110. For the agricultural and fishery goods, as well as in the case of provisional safeguard measures, the
investigation criteria includes factors such as the seasonal characteristics and difference in price, the degree of
perishableness and substitution, etc.
111. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 17 (in Korean) - ]-- ]--. sZ..]
Oil- V-a Al -ap. .
112. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 6.
113. Id.; Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 17(2) (in Korean) -
114. Id. art. 19(4) (in Korean) - 7- .1 -?] -qP q M14 ]t •
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products are forty-five days and-sixty days, respectively." 5
Referring to the suggestion, when the article subject to the measures is perishable
and seasonable, the following should be decided in consultation with the authorities
concerned: whether or not the import has increased significantly during a short period
of time or threatens to do so owing to its perishability, and whether or not economic
activities of a domestic industry, such as production, sales, and employment are
concentrated in a specific period owing to its seasonal characteristics.
In the case of the United States, the provisional safeguard measures are enforced
in two ways: monitoring and investigation. For instance, the import monitoring system
is employed for perishable produce" 6 and it is stipulated that provisional safeguard
measures should rapidly be taken upon request of the United States Trade
Representative when a serious injury or the threat thereof is reasonably indicated due
to the rapid increase in imports. "7 Namely, the International Trade Commission must
finalize the petition case within twenty-one days of the petition's filing date,"' and the
President must decide whether or not the measures should be enforced within seven
days of his receipt of the International Trade Commission's decision."9
Similarly, in the case of the EU, the surveillance measure may be imposed before
the enforcement of the safeguard measure or instead of imposing a safeguard measure
directly. This does not limit the import by itself, but requires the documents necessary
for import supervising to be submitted to the authority concerned, which has the
indirect effect of import restraints.' 20 The surveillance measure is grouped into the
retrospective measure and prior measure.'2 ' The retrospective measure is to supervise
the trends of importation of the goods to be liberalized completely' from the
115. Id. art. 19(1) (in Korean) -"a .I-4.r 3Q] -1"l1 i] - - Enforcement Decree of the
Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 19(3), (4) (in Korean) %- -- ,t
116. When the Trade Representative makes an affirmative determination that the imported product is a
perishable agricultural product; and there is a reasonable indication that such product is being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities as to be, or likely to be, a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to
such domestic industry, the Trade Representative shall request the Trade Commission to monitor and investigate the
imports concerned. The monitoring and investigation may include the collection and analysis of information that
would expedite an investigation. See Tariff Act of 1930 art. 202(d).
117. Id
118. Id. art. 202(d)(1)(C).
119. Id. art. 202(d)(1)(G).
120. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNiTY 169 (1995) (noting that:
There may be several reasons why a surveillance measure is adopted. Apart from the obvious
aim of gathering information on import trends, surveillance measures may be adopted in order to
signal concern over the trend of exports of a particular product into the Community to the
exporting countries concerned. Another possible motive behind the adoption of a surveillance
measures may be to monitor the application of a voluntary restraint arrangements with third
countries [before the WTO mechanism is applied]).
121. EC Council Regulation No. 3285/94 art. 11(1).
122. Particularly, in the case in which a surveillance measure is taken simultaneously with the liberalization of
importations, the decision to impose it must be by the Council, and in other cases the power to adopt surveillance
measures lies with the Commission. Id. art. 10(2).
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restricted import items without the specified provisions in the Council Regulation. In
the case of prior measure, the goods under prior surveillance may be put into free
circulation within the member countries when the required documents from the
authorities concerned of the member country are secured.'13 The investigation
procedure of the surveillance measure shall be applied in like manner when
conducting safeguard investigation; however, the EC Commission can impose the
surveillance measure at any time, regardless of the investigation procedure, when it is
deemed immediately necessary. 2 4 Alternatively, in Korea, the reasonably supervising
measure is required to be provisioned in the Act on the Investigation to work
harmoniously with the current safeguard measures, which could be lessened from the
legislative case of the EU.'25
The Act on the Investigation stipulates tariff increases as a provisional safeguard
measure,'2 fully reflecting the WTO Safeguard agreements.' 2 7 However, the United
States Tariff Act specifies not only tariff increases, but also restriction of import
quantity as a provisional safeguard measure.'2 In addition, the Council Regulation of
the EU 29 indirectly stipulates that the tariff increase measure may be taken if it is
likely to relieve the serious injury provisionally. This, however, does not necessarily
exclude the possibility of taking the import quantity measures. Therefore, in the case
of Korea also, the provisional safeguard measures need to be expanded by introducing
the import quantity restrictions. Furthermore, the import of perishable and seasonal
produce should be thoroughly monitored to allow prompt enforcement of safeguard
measures, considering the difficulty of recovering the injury.'30
123. Id. art. 12.
124. Id. arts. 8(1), 11(2). In practice, however, these provisions have never been used for mere surveillance
measures.
125. In the current Act on the Investigation the Trade Commission can investigate the effect of the import of
goods or the supply of services from foreign countries on the competitiveness of domestic industry. The Trade
Commission is authorized to require the documents necessary for investigation to be submitted to the head of
administrative organ concerned. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, arts. 25, 26 (in Korean)
126. Id. art. 29(1) (in Korean) 0 7 ' Al 1i 1 i- h 4 1 l1 3 ti-a.
127. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 6 (stating that"... such measures should take the form
of tariff increases to be promptly refunded if the subsequent investigation.., does not determine that increased
imports have caused or threatened to cause serious injury to a domestic industry...").
128. See Tariff Act of 1930 art. 202(d)(5)(B) (noting that "... the Commission shall give preference to
increasing or imposing a duty on imports, if such form of relief is feasible and would prevent or remedy the serious
injury or threat thereof").
129. Council Regulation (EC) No. 3285/94 of 22 December 1994 in the Common Rules for Imports and
Repealing Regulation (EC) No. 518/94, art. 8(3) stipulates that provisional safeguard measures should take the form of
an increase in the existing level of customs duty (whether the latter is zero or higher) if such action is likely to prevent
or repair the serious injury.
130. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930 art. 202(d)(1)(A) (providing that an entity representing a domestic industry
that produces a perishable agricultural product that is like or directly competitive with an imported perishable
agricultural product may file a request with the Trade Representative for the monitoring of imports of that product).
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E. Administrative Facts Related to Relief Measures
1. Validity of the Recommendation of Relief Measures
The Act on the Investigation stipulates that, within one month of the date of the
final decision on an injury case, the Trade Commission shall recommend the relief
measures to the head of the relevant administrative organ. 3' However, relief measures
proposed by the Trade Commission have often not been accepted by the head of the
relevant administrative organ. ,32 To confer persuasive power to the relief
recommendation, the Trade Commission shall prepare the proposal thoroughly by
analysing not only the relief measures themselves but other factors '33 such as
competitiveness of the industry, international trade relations, and consumers' interests,
so that the head of the relevant administrative organ will likely accept the proposal.'
As a short-run step, considering that the Trade Commission is a quasi-judicial and
quasi-independent organ, the relief measures recommended should be examined
objectively and comprehensively by the Adjustment Committee on International
Economy or the Council of the Ministers of Economic Affairs."'
The validity of the Trade Commission's recommendation to the head of the
relevant administrative organ or the President should be stipulated clearly, which is in
harmony with the Commission's legal status as the quasi-judicial organization. The
substantial and procedural stipulations also need to be made against the cases in which
the head of the relevant administrative organ denies or modifies the measures
recommended by the Trade Commission.
In both Korea and the United States, the Trade Commission's report to the
President is advisory. However, the U.S. Congress can override any presidential denial
of escape clause relief recommended by the International Trade Commission, and it
may override any decision of the President that differs from the type of relief
recommended by the Commission. Congress can do so by adopting a joint resolution
of disapproval.'36 Those provisions in the United States may be instructive to Korea's
131. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 17(1) (in Korean) -J" 7--'- S _.S ,].'_ 1] .L 1]oj]
-J,_ -; see BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 764 (explaining that in the United States:
Within 180 days of the date on which the petition was filed, the Commission must 'recommend
the action that would address the serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry and
be most effective in facilitating the efforts of the domestic industry to make a positive
adjustment to import competition').
132. See YU KEUN SHIN, - -ii-, supra note 22, at 168-69 (in Korean) 9- .. - Ai 0] R7-aA]_S.
133. See Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 17(3) (in Korean) - -
134. One of the reasons why the relief proposal of increase in the emergency tariff rate was not accepted by the
Ministry of Economy and Finance seems to be that it levied the Adjustment Duties on a number of imports instead of
the Emergency Duties recommended by the Commission.
135. The Adjustment Committee and the Council, which are composed of the ministers of economic and
industrial affairs and the high-level officials, deliberate the implementation of economic and trade policy and
regulations without being bound to the President.
136. See FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 82, at 321 (explaining that "[o]nce [a joint resolution of disapproval]
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decision to stipulate them in the Act.
Finally, the Trade Commission's recommendation should be made directly to the
President who should eventually be in charge of implementation of the measures,1
3 7
instead of the head of the relevant administrative organ. This issue, together with the
fairness and objectivity of the decision proceedings by the Trade Commission, would
also be related to the trade conflicts with other partner countries that have criticized
the lack of fairness and objectivity of operating the safeguard measures of Korea.
2. Implementation of Relief Measures
Upon receiving the recommendation of time-limited import restrictions, the head
of the administrative agency concerned may implement the relief measure as
recommended by the Trade Commission. In implementing a relief measure, the head
of the administrative organ concerned shall take into account the opinions of the other
head of the administrative organ concerned about its impact on international trade
relations and the national economy.3 '
The system would be more efficient if the President, like in the United States,'39
rather than the head of the administrative agency concerned, were charged with
implementing the relief measures. The President could evaluate the recommendations
of the Trade Commission with respect to the economy as a whole more effectively
than could the head of a particular administrative agency. In Korea, particularly,
egoism of the administrative agencies has often been indicated, which may affect the
objective evaluation of the recommendation made by the Commission.
In addition, the specific criteria to be used by the President in determining the
course of the action should be stipulated by the Act on the Investigation. 4' In deciding
whether to undertake escape clause relief, for example, the President may be required
to take into account the report of the Commission, the extent to which the workers and
firms in the industry are benefiting from adjustment assistance, the efforts being made
is enacted, the President is required to adopt the import relief previously recommended by the Commission. However,
the President may veto the joint resolution, in which case an override of the President's veto is required to obtain
relief").
137. For more details, see infra Part IM.E.2.
138. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 19(2) (in Korean) --- o - ]i iL
139. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. With regard to the lack of transparency and specificity in
Korea's trade law, the United States Trade Representative has indicated as follows:
The lack of transparency in rulemaking and in Korea's regulatory system continues to hamper
foreign firms' ability to compete on the Korean market. Many Korean trade-related laws and
regulations lack specificity. Korean officials exercise a great deal of discretion in applying
broadly drafted laws and regulations, resulting in inconsistency in their application uncertainty
among business. International guidance, developed by relevant ministers but rarely published,
directs their implementation and sometimes the regulations themselves are not made public.
United States Trade Representative, 2001 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, available at
http://l92.239.92.165/html/2001._contents.html (on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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by the industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition, the likelihood of
effectiveness of relief in facilitating such adjustment, and the short and long term
economic and social costs of the relief relative to their short and long term economic
and social benefits. The President should also consider: factors related to the national
interest of Korea, not limited to the economic and social costs if relief is not granted;
the impact on consumers and on competition in domestic markets; and the impact of
other countries' compensatory action on the domestic economy. The President should
further be directed to consider the potential for circumvention of any relief taken, the
national security interests, and those factors the commission is required to consider in
reaching its recommendations.41 A President who stands apart from the egoism of the
administrative agencies could evaluate these criteria comprehensively. The issue of
reassigning the responsibility for implementing the measures should be considered
concurrently with the issue of reorganizing the Trade Commission as a quasi-judicial
and independent organ for both formal and practical purposes.
Besides, with the recent acceleration of complete liberalisation of trade, Korea's
industry relief measures may not have equal impact on all industries because all
industries are not equally competitive. Therefore, the relief measures should be taken
discriminately depending on the degree to which an industry is exposed to the injury.
For instance, when a comprehensive relief measure is taken indiscriminately for an
industry having absolute competitiveness, allocation of industrial resources may be
distorted by including even uninjured industries in the structural adjustments, which
may cause a budgetary burden to the government. In such a case, it is more effective
to take a differentiated relief measure targeting the specific injured industry.
3. Promotion of Adjustment Assistance System
The purposes of the safeguard systems in the Act on the Investigation..4 and the
Customs Act 43 can be interpreted as prevention, relief, and structural adjustment of
industrial injury under the WTO Safeguard Agreement. Korea's adjustment assistance
system would aim to protect domestic industry by taking safeguard measures or
customs tariff measures to provide job search assistance and technical supports for
research and development, and to help adjust the industrial structure through long-
term and low-rate financing'"
However, the most desirable situation would be to reinforce the legal system to
promote the structural adjustment system for more effectiveness of safeguards. The
141. See, e.g., FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 82, at 322-23 (explaining that the President of the United States
decided not to grant escape clause relief because it might have an adverse effect on the bargaining position of the
United States in international trade negotiations at a time when there were ongoing GAIT negotiations as well as
UNCTAD negotiations about commodity trade).
142. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 1 (in Korean) -- T -] -l_ S] ]o11
143. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 65(1) (in Korean) 3ZA]1.
144. Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, art. 18 (in Korean) -o-', .- "
7_ A]lg 0
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safeguard measures are to be used actively to adjust the industrial structure, rather
than simply to relieve the industrial injury caused by imports. Such active use can be
accomplished by requiring petitioners to stipulate the purposes of safeguard measures
at the time of filing the petition. For this, the safeguard system of Korea should be
considerably less protectionist and more adjustment-oriented than in previous years.
Thus, Korea needs to complement the current assistance system by evaluating and
introducing the adjustment assistance system currently being executed in the United
States. 4
In the United States, there has been a growing trend in escape clause law to
provide adjustment assistance to workers and companies impacted by import
competition, rather than protective relief through presidential action because the first
authority for such assistance was provided in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.146
With respect to the application of safeguard measures in the United States, the petition
shall include a statement describing the specific purposes for which import relief is
being sought, which may include facilitating the orderly transfer of resources to more
productive pursuits, and enhancing competitiveness or other means of adjustment to
new conditions of competition.
147
In practice, petitioners in the United States normally do not file an escape clause
petition seeking adjustment assistance. Instead, they may apply for an escape clause
petition directly to the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce without going through an
escape clause proceeding. At that point, the President reviews information and advice
from the Secretary of Labor on the extent to which workers in the industry have
applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under the
Trade Act of 1974, or benefits from other manpower programs.148
The United States case suggests the direction for the development of Korea's
adjustment assistance system. Korea needs to establish an institutional apparatus to
support the adjustment of industrial structure within the boundaries conceded by the
WTO agreement. Korea also needs to introduce an industrial adjustment assistance
145. After the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the United States introduced the concept of "adjustment-
assistance" payments to workers who were dislocated because of imports. The United States has been operating the
adjustment assistance system complemented by the Trade Act of 1974, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994. Economists generally estimate a preference for granting
government assistance to the adjusting producers, especially if this assistance is designed to "nudge" the recipients
toward effective adjustment policies compared with import restraints, which may be self-defeating in the end. These
policies may involve moving completely out of production of particular uncompetitive products, or restructuring the
produce plants and organizations so that they can become competitive. However, there is a problem in that many
observers believe that the adjustment-assistance programs that have been tried in the United States and elsewhere have
failed to accomplish their purpose, and also have been very expensive. In times of budget constraints, persuading
political leaders to fund adjustment assistance has become increasingly difficult. In the view of many, this adjustment
assistance, although seemingly based on sound economic principles, has failed to achieve its goal of either assisting
adjustment or winning additional support for a liberal trade policy. Labor unions have called it "burial insurance," and
have refused to be overly impressed by the program. JACKSON Er AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 200-02.
These problems and criticisms should be taken account in Korea to expand the assistance program in the future.
146. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 82, at 327.
147. BRUcE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 757-58.
148. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2252(c)(1) (2001).
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system to relieve industrial injury caused by the rapid increase in imports as well as by
dumping or subsidy.
F. Operation of Safeguard Measures
The maximum duration of relief measures, which is four years with four additional
years extended if necessary,1 49 should be applied and interpreted equally for all types
of import relief measures in reflection of the WTO Safeguard Agreement. 50 The WTO
Safeguard Agreement stipulates that, when the duration of relief measures exceeds
three years, a member employing the relief measures shall review the situation not
later than the mid-term of the measure, and, if appropriate, withdraw it or expedite the
liberalization process.' To introduce this stipulation to the domestic legal system, the
Act on the Investigation specifies that the Trade Commission should re-examine the
relief measures to be relaxed, withdrawn, or extended before the mid-term when the
duration of relief measures exceeds three years. 52 The Act further requires the head of
the related administrative organ to attempt to phase down the relief measures."'
Conducting the review to relax or phase down the relief measures is desirable only
when relief measures including the tariff rate increase have already taken effect.
The relief measures of the WTO Safeguard Agreement include quantitative
restrictions, adjustment of tariff rates, and various assistance measures indicated
above.'T 4In Korea, the import quantity restriction is more effective than the tariff
measures because the tariff rate increase does not significantly affect the total price for
substantially cheap products, such as those imported from China. The Act on the
Investigation should specify the rules pertaining to the allocation of import quotas and
deviations from the WTO Safeguard Agreement, like in the EU.'
149. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 17(2) (in Korean) " t-I-- -. I1 l]5-l°l1
150. See Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 7(1) (specifying that "[a] Member shall apply
safeguard measures only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to
facilitate adjustment. The period shall not exceed two years, unless it is extended .. "); see also id. art. 7(3) (stating
that, "[t]he total period of application of a safeguard measure including the period of application of any provisional
measure, the period of initial application and any extension thereof, shall not exceed eight years").
151. Id. art. 7(4). In the United States, the provisions concerning the duration of safeguard measures are in
accord with those of the WTO Agreement. U.S. law provides that the protection shall ordinarily be phased down
during the period of relief. Section 203 also provides for a "four year period of relief, which can be extended to a total
of eight years if the [International Trade Commission] makes a determination that an extension is needed to prevent
injury and that a positive adjustment is occurring." JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 647. Thus, the
International Trade Commission must undertake a scaled-down version of the original investigation after a few years,
known as a "203 review." Id.
152. Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation, supra note 45, arts. 19(3), 20(t), (2) (in Korean)
153. Act on the Investigation, supra note 18, art. 19(3) (in Korean) _=r91 1M- A1,]- Ai d 1 -all :ll
154. Id. art. 17(1) (in Korean) -'7 131 U]7
155. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, art. 5(2)(a), (b). In the United States, whose safeguard
remedies are generally in harmony with the WTO Safeguard Agreement, the Act does not provide for the allocation of
import quotas and deviations from the Agreement. This is quite different from the EU, which has a specified
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The selective imposition of import quotas deviated from the principle of the most-
favored-nation treatment should be executed exceptionally when the import of a
specific good from a specific country increases at a rate disproportionate to the total
increase of imports of the product concerned.16 The import quota against Korea is
likely to be selectively imposed'57 because the Korean economy is highly dependent on
exports to advanced countries, such as the United States.' 58 Furthermore, Korea
maintains a relatively high market share in advanced countries compared to other
major competing countries and less developed countries, such as Indonesia and
Malaysia. 59 This selective measure is expected to be a large obstacle to Korea's
strategy of concentrating major export items because an item may be subject to the
selective regulation without rapid increase in export when the export quantities of
other competing countries are relatively sluggish or significantly decreased.' 6
stipulation about import quotas and deviations from the Agreement, without the specified stipulation about tariff
measures. For example, with regard to deviation from the Agreement in the EU, the obligation to see that consultations
are conducted under the auspices of the WTO Committee on Safeguards is not disregarded. Furthermore, the
Community may nevertheless depart from this method of allocation in case of serious injury, if imports originating in
one or more supplier countries have increased in disproportionate percentage in relation to the total increase of imports
of the product concerned over a previous representative period. EC Council Regulation No. 3285/94 art. 16(3)(b), (4).
156. See Urugyay Round Agreement on Safeguards art. 5(2)(b) (explaining that an importing nation may depart
from the principles of the most-favored-nation treatment and of the non-discrimination in allocating shares after prior
consultation with the Committee on Safeguards). The nation must show that departure is justified because imports
from certain nations have increased in disproportionate percentages, and that departure from the principles is justified
and equitable. Id.
157. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, supra note 120, at 170 (observing that in the EU, "while
the proceedings have been carried out on a non-discriminatory basis, the targets of [safeguard] cases ... have generally
been products (stoneware, quartz watches, beach slippers) essentially exported by Far Eastern countries such as South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the People's Republic of China). This fact implies that Korea will likely be
treated disadvantageously compared with the safeguard measures in EU countries.
158. For example, in 1997, the portion of exports to the United States out of Korea's total exports was about
16%; namely, US$21.625 billion out of total export amount of US$136.164 billion. The portion of Korea's total
exports to Japan was about 11%; that is, US$14.771 billion out of total export amount of US$136.214 billion. See, e.g.,
Monthly Bulletin, BANK OFKOREA 106-07 (Feb. 1998) (in Korean) ,..2--7-, -V-.
In 2000, the numbers differed slightly. The portion of exports to the United States out of Korea's total exports
was 20%, or US$34.032 billion out of total export amount of US$172.621 billion. The portion of exports to Japan out
of Korea's total exports remained at about 11%, or US$18.669 billion out of total export amount of US$172.621
billion. See Bureau of Statistics, at http://www.nso.go.kr (in Korean) -o -] (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer); see also Bank of Korea, at http://www.bok.or.kr (in Korean) tq'- (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer).
159. DAE KEUN LEE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF KOREA 418-421 (1996) (in Korean),o ] t-, t..'--qE.
Regarding this point, the Safeguard Agreement leaves considerable room for quantitative measures that are more
restrictive of imports from nations that have recently increased their market shares. Given the extent to which
selectivity has been a problem in the past, it will likely remain a controversial area. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 650.
160. See CHAE OOK, THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM 26-7 (1991) (in Korean) 4j, -6 -U ] o 7--All
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Referring to tariff measures, according to the Customs Act, adjustment duties may
be levied in the following cases:
a) to correct severe imbalance among tax rates caused by changes in
the industrial structure,
b) to protect health, consumers' interests, and the environment,
c) to protect a newly developed domestic product for a period of
time,
d) to protect the industrial fundamentals and the domestic markets
from being devastated by the importing of goods from less
competitive industries such as agriculture, forestry, or livestock. 36
Except in the cases of agriculture, forestry, and livestock, the customs tariff may be
levied within the range of concession tariff rates for the WTO tariff concession items
and within one hundred percent for the non-concession items.'62 Levying one hundred
percent of the adjustment duties on the WTO concession items violates the stipulation
of the GAT1 agreement that customs tariff rates should not be levied over the WTO
concession rates.'63 For the WTO tariff concession items, the levying of adjustment
duties is very likely to cause trade frictions with the partner countries exporting to
Korea. Therefore, the current adjustment duties system, as one kind of flexible tariff
system, 64 should be absorbed into the safeguard system, the anti-dumping duties, or
the countervailing duties system.' 6
Referring to ex post evaluation of the effectiveness of relief measures, the United
States Trade Act of 1974 stipulates that the International Trade Commission should
submit the evaluation report of the relief measures to the President and Congress
within 180 days of termination of the relief measures. 66 In the case of Korea, the items
against which relief measures were taken have rarely been evaluated.' 67 In order to
apply the safeguard system constructively, the Trade Commission needs to evaluate
whether or not the safeguard measures effected positive adjustment. For instance, one
alternative may be to institutionalize the submission of the evaluation report to the
President, Congress, and the Council of the Ministers of Economic Affairs. This final
evaluation system will be able to cooperate with the ex ante supervising system to
maximize the efficiency of safeguard measures.
161. Customs Act, supra note 19, art. 69 (in Korean) -A-] 'l.
162. Id. (in Korean) -'*-il d.
163. See GAIT 1947 art. ll(1)(a) (stating that "[e]ach contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the
other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate
Schedule annexed to this Agreement").
164. The government adjusts the tariff rate of certain goods flexibly within the scope permitted by the law in
order to cope promptly with changes in the domestic or foreign economic environment. The flexible tariff rate system
is provided in Korea's Customs Act, which includes anti-dumping duty, emergency duty, adjustment duty, and tariff
quota system, etc. EUN SuP LEE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-70 (1999)(IN KOREAN) 0] o7, -01 -"'d.
165. Yu KEUN SHMI, -LI --a, supra note 22, at 176 (in Korean) . .. q. ] ] 01 ]71-Al Y.
166. United States Trade Act of 1974 art. 204(c).
167. Yu KEuN SHIN, !0*4r-, supra note 22, at 184 (in Korean) 9]- _.'-rA A] ,01 E71-_A .
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IV. REORGANIZATION OF THE RELATED ORGANS
A. Reorganization of the Trade Commission
Generally, a unified or dual system is employed to relieve the industrial injury.
The industrial relief system of a country is influenced by the country's social, cultural,
and administrative backgrounds. The unified system is advantageous because the
charged organ performs its duty quickly and efficiently by assigning investigation of
the facts and judgment of the injury caused by exporters' dumping, subsidies, and
increased imports to the same organ. On the other hand, it is disadvantageous because
the investigation and the judgment may lack objectivity and fairness by centralizing
the authority into the same organ.
The dual system is beneficial because two independent organs conduct the
investigation and the judgment of industrial injury. On the other hand, it is detrimental
because it is relatively time-consuming and costly to complete the investigation of
exporters' dumping, subsidies, or increased imports and also to finalize the decision
on whether or not the domestic industry is injured. Korea has adopted the unified
system in that the Trade Commission is in charge of all steps of the investigation and
the judgment. The dual system may work better for relief of an industrial injury
because the procedure for industrial injury relief should be fair and objective.
Particularly, for developing countries like Korea, objectivity and fairness in the
application of relief measures are essential owing to the lack of experience in applying
relief measures compared to advanced countries.
Australia employs the unified system of anti-dumping measures on the surface.
However, in practice, Australia employs a plural system in the administrative organ.
For example, the Department of Industry, Science, and Tourism is in charge of
initiation of the investigation and judgment of the industrial injury. The branch
department of the Australian Customs Service initiates the investigation of the
industrial injury caused by dumping and subsidies and finalizes the investigation and
the judgment. Then, the branch department of the Anti-Dumping Authority is in
charge of the review of the final judgment by the Australian Customs Service.
The EU also employs the unified system, even in anti-dumping and countervailing
duties investigation and judgment, which reflects the realistic limitation of a
community comprising fifteen within-territory countries. In the case of the EU,
formally speaking, Commission and European Council are in charge of operating the
safeguard system. Any decision about safeguard measures taken by the Commission
must be communicated to the Council and to the member states, and any member state
may refer the decision to the Council. If a member state refers the Commission's
decision to the Council, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may confirm,




168. EC Council Regulation No. 3285/94 arts. 16(8), 17.
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Additionally, where the interests of the Community so require, the Council, acting
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission may adopt appropriate
measures to prevent import into the Community in the case of serious injury to
Community producers. 6 ' There has been no case, however, where the Council applied
these measures.170 In reality, this means that the Commission itself operates the EU
safeguard system, with the safety valve against potential problems that may result
from operation of the unified system.
In the future, Korea needs to employ the dual system of relief measures, including
measures such as anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties. To meet the future
demand of relief measures and to guarantee objectivity, efficiency, and specialty, the
Trade Commission should be reorganized in terms of its structure and functions. The
Trade Commission should be operated as a quasi-judicial independent organ, with a
standing Commission chair positioned as a Cabinet minister. If the Trade Commission
is operated as an organ independent not only of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry,
and Energy but also of the Office of the President, the Trade Commission can not only
take advantage of its reinforced power in performing its duty, but also may avoid
controversies with other administrative organs involved in Trade Commission
decisions by improving objectivity and fairness. Also, reducing administrative
discretion in investigation and judgment may obviate trade conflicts with other partner
countries.
There is one more reason that the Trade Commission should be organized
independently of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy. That is, although it
is highly probable that the domestic industry will be severely injured by the rapid
import increase in not only manufactured goods and agricultural products but also the
service industries, the current system does not seem to be efficient to face it. The
mechanism of the current Trade Commission, specified in the Act on the
Investigation, seems to be pertinent to manufactured products. As for the agricultural
or the service industry, the function of the Trade Commission is specified only for the
trade and the distribution industries against which relief measures have never been
applied. This is because the Trade Commission is associated with the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy, the minister of which administers only the trade and
distribution industries. Therefore, for example, when domestic service industries such
as finance, securities, insurance, lease, and tourism are seriously injured, determining
which administrative organ should be in charge of the investigation remains
questionable.
169. Id. art. 17.
170. Ivo BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIs BELLIS, supra note 120, at 325.
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The Trade Commission should help the domestic industries cope with the increase
in imports and examine the impact of imports on the competitiveness of the domestic
industry. In addition, the Trade Commission should build up the so-called "Early
Warning System"'' to prevent unnecessary trade conflicts with trade partner countries
and to prepare coping strategies. In the United States, the International Trade
Commission allocates a substantial portion of the total budget to in-depth research on
industrial competitiveness and industrial structure adjustment, which may offer
Korea an important hint to improve the injury relief system.
B. Establishment of the Court Specializing in Trade-Related Cases
The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that each member with legislative
provisions on anti-dumping measures maintain the independent judicial, arbitral, or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review
of administrative actions relating to final determinations.7 3 In order to guarantee
international public trust in the future, Korea's foreign trade law also needs to specify
the judicial relief procedure-so that a petitioner who insists that an industrial injury
has occurred due to dumping or a rapid increase in imports-can file for a judicial
review even when the Trade Commission rejects the petition.
For international public trust, specifying a legal basis in the Act on the
Investigation'74 or the Customs Act is necessary so that the interested parties can refute
the decision made by the Trade Commission or relief measures taken by the head of
the administrative organ concerned.
To realize this purpose, setting set up a special court similar to the United States
Court of International Trade, '7 or a special department in charge of international trade
171. The Early Warning System provides domestic exporters with ample data and information obtained from
thorough research on international trade laws, the trade system, and particular cases of competition.
172. For example, in the United States, while Section 201 cases have been rare in the past few years, U.S.
government "adjustment assistance" programs have remained active. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note
1, at 660. For example:
In 1992, [the U.S. government] expended some $42.7 million for assistance to workers, while
certifying approximately 50,000 workers as eligible for benefits under the program. In 1991 the
amount expended was $115.7 million. Year to year variations are explicable in considerable part
by changes in the duration of conventional unemployment insurance benefits. Expenditures on
the Commerce Department Program tend to be on the order of $10-15 million per year.
Id.
173. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 art. 13.
174. When established, the Trade Commission Act should specify this provision.
175. The Court of International Trade (CIT) in the United States is an Article court that is to be composed of 9
judges, not more than 5 of whom may be from the same political party. 1980 Act, Pub. L. No. 96-417 § 101, 94 Stat.
1727, codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 251 (1990). This Court was given the same powers of law and equity as a district court
of the United States, and was given exclusive jurisdiction over most suits against the United States arising under the
tariff and international trade laws.
The matters over which the CIT has jurisdiction include jurisdiction over civil actions filed to protest Customs
Bureau determinations as to the classification or valuation of imported goods; to challenge the collector's denial of
such a protest; to protest the imposition of duties or valuation as being too low (suits involving American producers or
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cases within the court, 76 like the European Court of Justice 177 would be advisable. If
the special court is established, the court can not only recruit specialized human
resources, but also may take advantage of its reinforced power in performing its
judgment by preventing inefficiency of manpower under the current rotating
assignment system in the judicature.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the 1960s, Korea has utilized both tariff and non-tariff measures to protect
domestic industries. Non-tariff measures have included the flexible tariff measures
such as anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and retaliatory duties;
implementation of the import supervision system;78 and implementation of the system
to diversify the countries from which it imported, which specifically avoided the
countries with which it had an excessive unilateral trade deficit, such as Japan. 79 As a
manufacturers); to challenge USITC and Treasury decisions relating to antidumping and countervailing duties; to
review determinations by the Labor and Commerce Departments relating to eligibility for adjustment assistance; to
consider applications for orders directing the USITC or the Treasury Department to disclose confidential information;
and to determine any civil action filed against the United States arising out of a U.S. law involving revenue from
imports and tonnage, tariffs, fees and other taxes imposed on imported goods for reasons other than to raise revenue,
embargoes of restrictions on the importation of merchandise and the administration and enforcement of U.S. custom
laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1988). This last subsection "is intended only to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court, and not to create any new causes of action not founded on other provisions of law." H.R.Rep. No. 1235, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1980).
In addition, the CIT has jurisdiction over suits brought by the United States to recover civil penalties based on
fraud or negligence (relating to imports), bonds relating to imported merchandise, and Customs duties. [28 U.S.C.A.
Section 1582(1990)]. Cited in BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 39, at 293-94, n.4.
176. It is encouraging that the supreme court (March, 1993) designated four collegiate bodies in the Seoul Civil
District Court as a grand bench specializing in international cases, followed by the similar ones in other Civil District
Courts in Pusan, Incheon, etc.
177. The Court of Justice is regarded as one of the most interesting, and from a judicial point of view, most
impressive institutions of the European Union. Thirteen judges, assisted by six Advocates General, form a judicial
institution that has been given an impressive array of powers and has exercised them in a remarkably forthright way.
The Court's work has on the whole enhanced both the unity and the central powers of the EU institutions. The
European community operates within a system of judicial review, which is indicated as very similar to that of the
United States, and very different from the judicial systems in some of the major EU member states. Given the
relatively subordinate role of the judiciary in many European government systems, it would be striking to find such a
strong judicial role played in the EU structure.
178. The import supervision system was introduced as one method to supplement the import-liberalization
policy in the Trade Transaction Act of 1967 to help protect infant domestic industries and to achieve balance in
international payments. Under this system, the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy had the power to take
certain measures to restrict the import of specific goods such as agricultural products or luxurious consumer goods
nominated as import supervision items, which might have an injurious effect on domestic industries.
However, there have been many problems in the operation of this system because it lacked sufficient criteria for
determining the injurious effects on domestic industries. That is, there were no provisions for determining causation
between the import and the concerned industries' injury, or for establishing the criteria for implementing the import
supervision system. As a result, Korea has incurred protests from its trading partners, including the United States, for
undue protection measures. This system has been modified and developed into the system to investigate industrial
injury from imports as an import relief mechanism of the current Act on the Investigation. See HYUN JONG SHIN,
KoREA's FOREIGN TRADE 608-10 (1992) (in Korean) 0 18 1, -l'*' -.
179. Korea has had an excessive deficit in bilateral trade with particular counterpart countries such as Japan.
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result of these measures, which have not been regarded as being as effective as
intended, the import relief provisions were substantially modified in 1996 for the ex
post facto protection of domestic industry, with a view to liberalizing international
trade rather than protecting infant industries. The Korean government regards the
modified provisions as being almost in accordance with the requirements of the WTO
Safeguard Agreement and other international regulations concerned.
In Korea, potential petitioners for the relief measures have doubted that an import
relief system could be operated in a timely and efficient manner. This fact has been
borne out by the historical experiences of the Korean government. The government
has rarely depended on import relief measures, even when rapid increases in imports
have threatened the stability of domestic industries and markets. This is because the
Korean Government, having experienced trade frictions with partner countries, has
been very vulnerable to partner countries' negative attitudes toward Korean relief
measures. One major reason for such vulnerability is that Korea has a small and open
economic system, which makes the economy heavily dependent on international trade.
Additionally, Korean export items are not competitive in price and quality with those
of other competing countries. Particularly, Korean authorities in charge of the import
relief system have not been considered to be objective and fair in their investigations
and judgments in the international trade area.
Korean industries are currently in a tremendously volatile state due to increased
competition caused by rapid market openings as well as by recent problems in the
financial sector, forcing the basic direction of economic development to be confronted
with confusion. Meanwhile, Korea is concentrating on the enlargement and
development of international trade. To realize its blueprint for harmonization with the
liberalized global market system, Korea must improve the operating procedures of the
institutions in charge of the investigation and judgment of industrial injury caused by
imports.
For example, the trade deficit with Japan was US$8.451 billion in 1993 and US$7.858 billion in 1992, with total
deficits (including current account and capital account) of US$1.784 billion and US$5.143 billion respectively. Since
1978, Korea has adopted a trade policy to encourage diversification of importation by regulating imports from
countries such as Japan, with which Korea has recorded excessive deficits in bilateral trade, while at the same time
expanding imports from countries such as the United States and the EU countries. Id. at 606-08 (in Korean) ,
.--- . However, this policy, which may have been in conflict with the principle of non-discrimination under the
GATI/WTO system, was repealed in 1998.
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Many of Korea's foreign trade laws have been enacted and modified passively due
to the express or implied pressure from trading partners like the United States and
because of the requirements of international organizations like the WTO and OECD.
Thus, such modifications are not the Korean government's voluntary response to
internal public and private sector concerns. The modifications may have occurred in
this manner because during the last forty years, Korea's rapid economic growth and
development was influenced by the government's strong export-driven policy, and the
Korean economy depended heavily on foreign trade. However, under the WTO
mechanism, Korea's foreign trade regulations should be improved voluntarily and
continuously to promote free and fair trade without serious injury to its domestic
industry.
